Review of Putinism

Pang Dapeng

Abstract: The development of the times and the prevailing forces in different ages have divided the 24-year-old post-Soviet era into two periods: The Yeltsin age and the Putin age. Vladimir Putin's governing philosophies and measures are conceptualized as “Putinism”, whose doctrines and characteristics have raised a debate among academics between the Western world and Russia about state governance and development path. The two sides have different interpretations about Putinism, which is coherent and logical inside and reflects Russia's national characters and tradition of state governance. It features political control, economic politicization and diplomatic extension. In nature, Putinism is strategic readjustment made by Putin to address the consequences of the dissolution of the former Soviet Union and meet the demand of Russia's transition. It has significant impact on the world situation and Russia's development.

Keywords: Russia, Putinism, Conservatism, State governance, Development path

1．Introduction

After the dissolution of Soviet Union, Russia has been in the process of transition and development for 24 years. Now, whenever Russia is mentioned, Putin will be the first name that pops out of people's mind. In October 2014, the First Deputy Chief of Staff of the Presidential Executive Office, Vyacheslav Volodin,said at the Valdai Discussion Club that “no Putin, no Russia”. Putinism, a term that highly generalizes Putin's governing philosophies has become a key word in Russia studies.

Putinism, before it goes popular, was often referred to as “the phenomenon of Putin”. When Putin was sworn in as the President of the Russian Federation in 2000, he proposed “Russian New Thought” and “Great Power Strategy”, which were refreshingly new both at home and abroad. Around 2001, some Russian experts started to argue about “the phenomenon of Putin”. The Phenomenon of Putin means the public shows support to Putin's governing philosophies and measures and have faith in him and the position of president, although the country has not yet turned well-off because of him. Vyacheslav Nikonov, President of the Polity Foundation, argued that Putin's thoughts are Gaullist conservatism, a combination of liberal economy and strong regime. Such regime gives a heavy emphasis on power and patriotism, and adopts an open but independent and proactive major-power foreign policy. Fedor Burlatsky, a Russian political theorist, believed that the cult of Putin is in line with Russia's traditional belief in political hardliners who are bold to correct social maladies. When Russia was struggling for a breakout from a crisis, Putin, as an individual, surprisingly answered to the people's call.

After the Yukos case in 2003 and the Beslan school siege in 2004, Putin carried out a series of political measures to centralize power. “Putinism” came into being. In late 2003, Dmitri Trenin, director of the Carnegie Moscow Center, published an article titled Pirouettes and Priorities:Distilling a Putin Doctrine on The National Interest.This is the first publication I have known of that clearly themes “Putinism” or “Putin Doctrine”. Trenin analyzed the connotations of Putinism and the challenges facing it, arguing that the key issue of Putinism lies on the nature of Russia's capitalism instead of the quality of Russia's democratic reform. The transformation of the appointment of the chief executive of the federation has utterly corroded Russia's already vulnerable democratic system. Since then, the term “Putinism” has been widely used in the literature of Russia studies.

Putin himself has never used “Putinism”. In Russia, it is mostly used by liberal academics. But it doesn't hinder our studies on Putinism from a Russian perspective. I believe that Putinism is an angle, a statement and a platform to explore and understand Russia. What is Russia? What makes Russia? These are the ultimate questions for Russia studies. By distinguishing Putinism in Western rhetoric from the Russian conservatism in Russia's official ideology, we can expand our horizon and get a better and wider understanding of Russia.

2．Analysis of Putinism

Before we try to explore Russia and study where it is heading, we must have a better understanding of Putin and his governing philosophies and measures. Putinism is a key to knowing Russia.

2.1 Putinism in Western perspective

In a Western perspective, Putinism has gone through a few stages of development. The Yukos case in 2003 heralded Putin's crackdown on Oligarch capitals. After “Color Revolution” in the Commonwealth of the Independent States since 2003, Putin tightened his grip on politics. After the Beslan school siege in 2004, Putin abolished the direct election of regional governors. All these measures have made significant impact on Russia's development. Putin's reform is different from that of Boris Yeltsin. The West argued that many events around 2004 marked the hastened decline of Russia's democracy. A US-based democracy research institution Freedom House named Russia in its annual report as “not a free country, ” which was the first time since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Western academics, in an effort to impact public opinion, started to use “Putinism”, instead of “controllable democracy”, to comment on Putin's policies. In this period of time, Putinism mainly indicated Russia's political reform policies the West disliked.

After Putin's presidential term of office ended in 2008, the Putin-Medvedev power structure came into being, with Putin still at the center of power. Putinism became popular amongst the Western academics, who commented on Putin's 8-year term of office under the theme of “Putin's Plan, in essence, is Putinism and its political route”. They believed Putinism is Russia's nationalist governing philosophy under the cover of freedom and democracy, at the heart of which is anti-West diplomacy.

After the crisis in Ukraine broke out in late 2013, Putinism became a heated topic again in the Western public opinion. Western academics argued that Russia's major task, after Putin's retaking the office of president, is to regain its economic, political and geopolitical strategic advantages that it lost in 1991. The key issue of Putinism after the crisis in Ukraine is to ensure Russia's national security in a reasonable sphere of influence based on “Russia's historical legacy.”The West raised a hype against Russia, arguing Putinism is not only going to jeopardize Russia's growth, but also pose a threat to the global stability.

Based on the current information, Putinism has been hyped up by the West in three periods of time: In 2004 when Russia was at a crossroad of modifying its development path, in 2008 when the continuity of Putin's 8-year-long effective measures was at a critical moment, in 2013 when the implementation of Russia's Eurasia strategy and its rise as a major power came to a crucial stage. Every time when Russia is at a critical moment to make strategic decisions, the West would get vocal about Russia's policies and try to intervene. Putinism has become an intersection of these voices.

There are mainly three dimensions of Putinism in a Western perspective:

First, anti-Westernism. From a Western point of view, Russia's anti-Westernism is a reflection of neo-realism, which, on the one hand, carries on Russia's traditional employment of realpolitik, and on the other, recognizes the importance of inter-dependence and economic globalization. In the neo-realistic framework, Putin wants to come up with a policy that can integrate Russia with the rest of the world, and safeguard its national interest. This means Russia wants to get involved into the Western world, but refuses to be assimilated. Russia wants to be part of the West in its own way. The truth is, such a wobbly state cannot last long, because there are two major structural barriers: First, Russia has serious problems with bureaucratic corruption and the low efficiency of the monopolistic economic system; Second, Russia is in defiance of the Western systems because of many historical and current reasons, and only when a comprehensive reform over the Russians'national mentality and traditional cultures is complete can Russia entirely join the ranks of the Western world.

Second, imperialist thinking. In the eyes of other former Soviet Union members, Russia is regarded and felt as an empire. Russia is “the other” of these countries, which want to repeal their Russian elements and re-construct their self-identities. Politically and culturally, these countries are looking up to the West and trying to escape Russia's control. But as for Russia that wants to design its internal and external concepts about space, there is not a “the other”in its cognition matching its status quo as a modern state. The situation closely relates to Russia's geography, history, culture and current politics. Russia's national characteristics determines that although Russia has given up the thought of overturning the global structure of capitalism as an ideological leader or becoming a geopolitical champion that leads a military and political camp, it has not given up the hope of being a civilization-state and a global leader. The continuity of Russia national characteristics is ensured by its legacy – the political clout left by the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union and the memory of being a global major power in 300 years. The memory, even the country is in a downturn spiral, can be used to keep its status as a major power. The US believes Russia is inclined to stage a come-back as an empire when dealing with the affairs concerning the Commonwealth of the Independent States. Zbigniew Brzezinski, former US national security advisor, argued that Russia's transformation into a fully democratic state without imperialist ambitions would be slow and bumpy. Russia should become a democratic country without imperialist ambitions, putting itself in the right place as a nation-state and getting on good terms with its European neighbors. The US believes that Russia does not only aim for a restoration of the Russian Empire, but also attempt to regain the status of super power. Russia obviously cannot fulfill the vision by means of economic development, but the US worries that it will accomplish the goals by enhancing its military capabilities.

Third, centralized political system. The West takes Putin's a series of political reforms, from the democratic point of view, as aggressive, especially after the Beslan school siege. The US has started to consider the possibility of Russia restoring a centralized political structure, showing concern for Putin seeking control of politics as in the Soviet Union.An article The Putin Doctrine-Russia's Quest to Rebuild the Soviet State, authored by Leon Aron, director of Russia studies at the American Enterprise Institute, is an example of the West's thoughts.The article argues that the real purpose of “Putinism” is to let the state re-take control of politics and economy, which will inevitably result in authoritarianism. The restoration of the Russian authoritarianism is forcing Putin to seek legitimacy of his government from foreign affairs. Thus, Putin will keep making threats from outside. This model of seeking legitimacy can be called “the besieged fortress strategy”. Anne Applebaum,a Washington Post columnist who holds a Philippe Roman Chair in History and International Affairs at the London School of Economics and Political Science,argued in her article Putinism:The Ideology that the underpinnings of Putinism reflect the culture and values of KGB, and contain elements of managed democracy and corporate capitalism. The key elements of Putinism are rigged elections and manipulated media. Putin's clique, out of considerations of ideology and in order to maintain its legitimacy of governance both at home and abroad, strives to maintain an ostensible democracy and capitalist economy, and lash out at the West and its Pro-West neighbors.

2.2 Putinism in Russia's perspective

In the perspective of the Russian pundits, Putinism is a political jargon coined by their Western counterparts and often used to debase Putin's governing theories, guidelines and policies. Russia's political scientists rarely use Putinism, which, if any, could be seen on some articles written by the liberals. For example, Vladimir Ryzhkov, former first deputy chairman of the State Duma and the cochair of the People's Freedom Party,published an article titled The New Putin Doctrine on Moscow Times, arguing that the annexation of Crimea does not only indicate Russia's dramatic turn in its foreign policy, but also marks the birth of new Putinism. Putin's successful annexation of Crimea may herald the beginning of a bigger current, which is the possibility that Moscow might swallow up other regions. According to Ryzhkov, the new Putinism includes the following concepts: 1) Russia no longer treats the West as a reliable partner;2) Russia no longer sees itself as part of Europe, let alone part of the EuropeAtlantic civilization; 3) the international law is no longer a set of rules or a series of reference books; 4) the new Putinism is applicable in all members of the former Soviet Union; 5) the Westphalia principle only works for powerhouses; 6) International institutions like the United Nations, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe and the European Council are playing a much smaller role in global affairs; 6) the new Putinism is established on the new equilibrium of global power structure. Putinism is reminiscent of the Brezhnev Doctrine, so the Russian experts think the concept was also coined and hyped by the West. Since the West do not agree with Putin's governing philosophy, it is thus understandable that the Russian experts have an aversion to Putinism.

In Russia, Putin's governing philosophy and system are usually generalized as Russian conservatism. The Russian conservatism is an officially recognized statement that has been written into the constitution of the United Russia. On December 13th, 2013 when Putin delivered his first address to the Federal Assembly after he reinstated the presidency, he declared that Russia would stick to a conservative position and ensure respect for the sovereignty, independence and unique identity of each people.

The implementation of Conservatism is a national outcome of the development of Putin's governing philosophy.

Putin's governing philosophy grows out of the Russia's New Thought. Three political statements–Russia at the Turn of the Millennium,written by Putin and published on Nezavisimaya Gazeta in December 1999,Open Letter to Voters in February 2000, and the address to the Federal Assembly in July 2000- signified the initiation of the New Thought, which is very targeted and values patriotism, big-power consciousness, state authority and the spirit of mutual support in the society. The new current of thought aims to reverse the Atlanticism, which had been dominating Russia since 1990s and pursued by the democrats to integrate Russia into the hemisphere of the Western civilization. Putin's governing philosophy took shape during this period of time, and based on the New Thought, he brought forward the great power strategy and gradually figured out a governing system with Putin's characteristics.

Putin's governing philosophy grows out of “sovereign democracy, ” a concept whose emergence has close ties with Putin's endeavor to fend off Color Revolution at the late stage of his first tenure, eliminate political pressures and ensure the sustainability of his path. On February 24th, 2005, in the Russia-US leader summit in Bratislava, former president George W. Bush demanded Putin comply with the rules of democracy, and showed concerns about Russia's domestic politics. Putin responded by reiterating that democracy's improvement should be based on Russia's realities, and Russia wouldn't tolerate any foreign effort that harms its national interest under the cloak of democracy. Putin also said that the improvement of democratic principles and systems must align with Russia's realities and tradition. Putin emphasized that “the implementation of the principles and norms of democracy should not be accompanied by the collapse of the state and the impoverishment of the people. We believe, and I personally believe, that the implementation and the strengthening of democracy on the Russian soil should not jeopardize the concept of democracy. It should strengthen statehood and should improve living standards for the people. It is in this direction that we're going to act.” On April 25th, 2005, Putin delivered his annual address to the Federal Assembly, in which he cut to the chase at the beginning – “In this Address of 2005 I will dwell on a number of fundamental ideological and political issues. I believe such a discussion is essential at the current stage of Russia's development … I consider the development of Russia as a free and democratic state to be our main political and ideological goal.” The speech raised a heated debate among the Russia elite. On April 28th, Vitaliy Tretyakov,former editor-in-chief of Nezavisimaya Gazeta,published an article at the Rossiyskaya Gazeta titled Sovereign Democracy:Putin's Political Philosophy, in which he became the first one to put forward the concept of “sovereign democracy.” Actually as early as October 2002, Tretyakov had examined the anatomy of Putin's philosophy and called him a “liberal conservative.” He argued that the priority of Putin's concern is the existence of the Russian Federation and whether it is politically independent and influential, then comes which political system Russia should implement. Democracy only works better when it can be used to rejuvenate Russia. The proposal of the sovereign democracy is meant to answer an urgent practical issue in theory:What kind of country is Russia under the leadership of Putin? Where is Russia heading – embracing the West or falling back from democracy to dictatorship? Putin's answer is that Russia is sovereign and democratic nation, not the former Soviet Union or the Russia in 1990s. The sovereign democracy is a result of Russia learning from both positive and negative experiences in the contemporary age.

Putin's governing philosophy gets into shape from Russia's conservatism. After the 2008 presidential election, Putin's team, out of a holistic consideration of the domestic politics, has turned the sovereign democracy into an official ideology that mainly features as conservatism. In November 2008, when the ruling United Russia's 10th congress was convened, Boris Gryzlov, chairperson of the Supreme Council of United Russia, clearly stated that the ruling party's ideological foundation is conservatism. In November 2009, the 11th congress of the United Russia passed a new party constitution, in which it stipulates that Russian conservatism is the United Russia's ideology. The nature of conservatism is actually the sovereign democracy that has been expounded by the Russian authorities since 2005. However, the financial crisis in 2008 has urged the Russian society to reflect on the path they chose. In September 2009,then Russian president Dmitry Medvedev published an article titled Go Russia! , in which he proposed a concept called“new political strategy.” In November that year, based on the new concept, he wanted Russia to “undergo comprehensive modernization” in his address to the Federal Assembly. The new political strategy and the comprehensive modernization proposal, both of which have a tinge of liberalism, are different from Putin's conservatism. Medvedev and Putin share the same goal of making Russia great again, but both of them have different political ideas about how to achieve the goal. The disagreement has made an impact on Russia's political dynamics. After Putin reinstated in 2012, the first problem that encountered him was to deal with the new changes in the political sphere. After a series of reforms over the political system, Russia's political arena was stabilized. After that, Putin needed to bridge the gap in public opinion and the elite, which was caused by the disagreement in the Medvedev-Putin tandem. Since the second half year of 2013, when the Valdai conference was initiated, Putin's team started to pay keen attention to the issue of the state ideology with the aim of stabilizing the social ethos and the regime by promoting the mainstream political values. Under such circumstances the Russian conservatism was brought forth again.

From the Russia's perspective, Putinism is comprised of three aspects:

First, sovereignty and democracy. 1) Russia has chosen the path of democracy, holding dear freedom and democracy as the universal values of the entire human race and a broad road for the development of human society. 2) Russia is a sovereign state and can independently choose its internal and external policies without any foreign interference. 3) democracy, as a system and principle, must be in line with Russia's realities and traditions. 4) democracy is a process, and Russia is still at an initial stage.

Second, tradition and modernity. The Russian conservatism is a combination of Russia's tradition and modernity. In modern Russia, conservatism does not have derogatory implications, but an embodiment of Russia sticking to its traditional values. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, an ideological nihilism emerged in Russia, and for a long period of time, there would be a lack of proper conditions to forge mainstream political values. For a powerhouse like Russia, it is dangerous not to have a united value across the society. After Putin took power, the Russian society has gone through many hardships caused by lack of mainstream political values. In addition, given a new generation after the fall of Soviet Union are growing up, it becomes necessary to establish a unified thought across the society. The Russian conservatism becomes a natural product. The Russian conservatism is opposite to totalitarianism and radical liberalism. The core concept of the Russian conservatism is against all radical revolutions, and advocates reconciliation to deal with interest conflicts between different social forces.

Third, concept and system. The essence of the Russian conservatism is in line with the uniqueness of the evolution of Russia's system. Such uniqueness is mainly reflected in three aspects: 1) Russia's transformation revolves around the state not the society; 2) Russia's monopoly-dominated economic structure is related to the government-led collective management system; 3) Russia's national characteristics – a centralized governance system at home and an inclination to build buffer zones at abroad - have made significant impact on the country's transformation. The three elements that drive system transformation completely tallies with the essence of the Russian conservatism, which is based on the belief in the power of the state, the mission to save the world and the Orthodox Church.

2.3 Reasons for different understandings of Putinism between West and Russia

In fact, Western scholars have accurate knowledge of Russia's development. Andrew Kuchins, a prominent Russia expert at the Brookings Institute, pointed out that the Putinism aims to recover Russia's status as a great power and elevate the wellbeing of the Russians. In order to change Russia's fate and achieve the goal, Putin believes that the first step should be consolidate social unity, which will ensure political stability and thus motivate economic revival and improve people's livelihood. The second step is to seek external stability. Putin is convinced that only when a country holds its fate in its own hands can it make meaningful plans for its future. This is sovereign democracy in political terms. As the global oil price hikes, Russia starts to rebuild its international political sovereignty. Russia argues that some elements in the international system, many of which were formed when its economy was in recession, are not reasonable and fair. The Western countries keep pushing Russia aside off the international system, while Washington's unilateral policy is far from being qualified to safeguard the stability of the global economic system. The Putinism, comprised of state capitalism, the sovereign democracy and a practical foreign policy, will make sure Russia still a powerhouse. On December 19th, 2007, Putin was enlisted as the Person of the Year by Time Magazine,who said Putin“has performed an extraordinary feat of leadership in imposing stability on a nation that has rarely known it and brought Russia back to the table of world power.”

Western experts' analysis is basically in compliance with Russia's realities. Although having a clear knowledge about Russia, the West still point fingers at Putin's policies, which, generalized by the Russian government and experts as the Russian conservatism, are actually in line with Russia's national conditions and a combination of Russia's traditions and realities. Then what makes the West and Russia hold different views about Putinism?

First, different values. Fareed Zakaria, a prominent expert on Russia studies, published an article titled The Rise of Putinism on the Washington Post, arguing that “the crucial elements of Putinism are nationalism, religion, social conservatism, state capitalism and government domination of the media. They are all, in some way or another, different from and hostile to, modern Western values.”

Second, different views about geopolitics. The collapse of the Soviet Union resulted in Russia losing its sphere of influence in East Europe and cutting its territory back to the size before Peter the Great conducted the expansion plan. In international relations, Russia has lost its status as an equivalent rival of the US. In face of some major global affairs that are of vital importance to Russia's interests, such as the Balkan situation and the expansion of NATO, Moscow has often been ignored, which makes the Russians humiliated. In the first few years after Putin took power, Russia prioritized political stability, and self-consciousness took the second place. The economic recovery and political stability have made Russia pay attention to its status in the global dynamics, regain its control over the Commonwealth of Independent States, and build a Eurasia strategy. As Aleksandr Dugin, leader of the Eurasia Movement, pointed out, in a US-dominated unilateral world, Russia's foreign policy has three options – to be Westernized, to be Sovietized or to implement a Eurasia strategy. To be Westernized means Russia joining in the US-led unilateral world, compromising its geopolitical sovereignty for better perks and benefits. But the path is equivalent to a denial of Russia's great-power foreign policy, and will degrade Russia's international status. To be Sovietized means Russia resurrecting the Soviet-style foreign policy that features a closed-up system. This is nothing more than a retrogression in the era of globalization. Therefore, Russia should choose the Eurasia policy, which is a proactive strategy with its eyes on a polarized world. However, the West is eager to infiltrate into the Commonwealth and support anti-Russia forces, by doing which they want to restrain Russia's influence within its borders. Putin has adopted a tit-for-tat countermeasure, which makes the West feel unacceptable. There is no wonder they hold such a negative view on Putinism.

Third, Russia's development path. Russia's constitutionalism, whose foundation was laid by Yeltsin, is not changed. What has been changed in Putin's era is the state governance model under the framework of constitutionalism. Yeltsin managed to transform the combination of legislative and executive powers in the Soviet era to the constitutional system with separation of powers. Putin has successfully improved and consolidated the constitutional system under the principles of new authoritarianism, which is a major change of the country's governing model. Moreover, Putin has made the country's development path, under the framework of constitutionalism, more Russian, which means Putin has brought Russia to a familiar development path. The Orthodox Church brings rulers a sense of mission, the authoritarian culture breeds the admiration for strong political figure, and the people's affinity to the regime. These are at the core of the conflicts between Russia and the West, which cannot tolerate Putin for leading Russia onto a path of being more Russian.

3．Comment on Putinism

Putinism has collectively reflected the Russian elite's exploration of Russia's development path, in which they intend to answer a question – what kind of development model and operation system does Russia need so that the country can rise again and realize a revival? Based on the analysis of Putinism, this section is my comment on the logic and meaning of Putinism.

3.1 The background of Putinism

Putinism is the product of the times. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia's development in the following 24 years can be divided into four distinguished periods: the Yeltsin age features dramatic changes and turbulences;the first eight years of Putin's reign shows Russia's modification, recovery and stabilization; the Medvedev-Putin tandem age features their dealing with economic crisis and the opening of a comprehensive modernization; the years after Putin's return to Kremlin in 2012 marks Putin's new rule. From the perspective of the content of the times and the dominant force that drives the historical development, the past 24 years can be divided into two ages: the Yeltsin age and the Putin age.

Under Yeltsin's rule, Russia's overall strategy was to become Westernized and conduct a holistic reform, with the aim of involving Russia into the big family of the Western civilization as soon as possible. However, the process was not as smooth as expected. Russia paid a high price to restructure the country, which resulted in the outbreaks of political, economic and social crises and the grave decline of its international status.In Russia at the Turn of the Millennium,Putin said that “Russia is not a state symbolizing top standards of economic and social development now. And it is facing difficult economic and social problems … For the first time in the past 200～300 years, it is facing a real threat of sliding to the second, and possibly even third, echelon of world states.”

In his first eight years of ruling, Putin achieved three major tasks: First, he changed the strategy of the country's development strategy, and vowed to build a powerful Russia. Second, he rebuilt Russia's authoritarian and vertical power system, making the country's political and legal systems unified. Third, he put the economic lifeline industries into the hands of the state, and turned the country from liberal capitalism to state capitalism. Through the three purposeful achievements, the Russian regime was consolidated, its economy recovered, the Russians' living standard was raised, and Russia went back to the global arena as a great power. In the Medvedev-Putin era, Putin was actually in charge. He dealt with the financial crisis, transited from “Putin's plan” to Medvedev's “new political strategy, ” and initiated a modernization strategy, which he wanted to be thorough and complete, including the modernization of the people. He wanted to break away from the philanthropic parentalism that is prevalent in Russia.

Putin's new era has some new characteristics. On January 16th, 2012, Putin published a campaign article on Izvestia titled Russia muscles up–the challenges we must rise to face. In the article, he proposed a new political concept - the new stage of global development - that has a significant influence on the Russia's overall development. The emergence of the “new stage” has close ties with the political dynamics after the Duma elections in 2011. There was an unprecedentedly anxious call for social and political reforms. Putin's response was to go with the current. He ramped up political competitiveness while maintaining political stability – this is the new characteristic of the new era. In order to maintain political stability, Putin does not only have to adapt to the new realities and strengthen political reforms, but also face economic downturn and the challenges posed by the outside after the Ukraine crisis.

Generally speaking, after Putin took power, Russia has kept its choice of constitutional democracy and market economy. Although the systems are not perfectly developed by Russia, the trend cannot be reversed. Meanwhile, Russia is encountered with grave difficulties and potential risks. From a lot of parameters, such as economic structure, management efficiency, technical equipment and corruption, Russia is not getting better, but worse.

Now, in an economic and social crisis, Russia is faced with a lot of challenges such as economic sanctions from the West, economic stagnation and low oil price. Putin's development plan that was devised when he regained power in 2012 is hard to be implemented. Common sense might say Putin's support rate would decline and remain at a low ebb, but a social awareness called post-Crimea consensus was raised. The post-Crimea consensus means after the Ukraine crisis breaks out, taking Crimea back becomes a new element that has fostered Russia's social stability. Igor Bunin, director of the Center for Political Technologies, argued that “almost without a single shot, the Crimea becomes ours. This awakens everything imperial that was in consciousness …Putin's rating immediately rises to a high level. And for a while it will remain on the transcendental level.” In order to become great again and recover Russia's past glory, the Russians are willing to endure. “I don't care about the ban …I'm not scared. We lived through World War II. We'll live through this.” I believe that underestimating the Russian people's endurance makes the West hold bearish view about Russia. The post-Crimea consensus has made multiple impacts on the Russian society. For example, Eduard Limonov's Strategy-31 party embodies an anti-Putin sentiment, but the party split over whether it should support the government's action on Crimea. This can perfectly show Russia's mainstream social sentiment. A party could fall into infighting because it cannot agree on whether it should support the post-Crimea consensus and Putin, this, from another perspective, indicates the influence of Putin's influence and measures on Russia's political life. Putin has been making full use of this situation, maneuvering the social ethos and sentiment under the consensus. The post-Crimea consensus actually reflects a typical social atmosphere, which in essence shows the Russian society's overwhelming support of Putin's governing philosophy and measures.

In general, during Putin's 15-year-long rule, Russia has transformed from comprehensive Westernization to a return to tradition. Aside from inheriting Yeltsin's legacy in reform, Putin attaches importance to Russia's characteristics in terms of history, culture and spirit, and leads the country to realize modernization.

3.2 The intension of Putinism

Putinism is not only a product of the times, which is logical internally, but also in line with Russia's national characteristics and ruling traditions. The intension of Putinism can be generalized into three aspects – it has strong control over politics, it makes economy more political, and its diplomacy has a wide range of extension.

First, it has strong control over politics.

Putin's political measures during the new era can indicate Putinism's strong control over politics. After taking the top office again, Putin introduced a series of reform measures to expand political participation and enhance political competitiveness. But Russia's power structure has not been radically changed. The party system, parliamentary system, electoral system and federal system remain the same.

In terms of the party system, the threshold for founding a party has been lowered, but party coalition is still forbidden, in which way the ruling party can weaken the force of the opposition. Besides, the registration for a political party could be aborted if it fails to pass a legal vetting. In terms of the parliamentary and election systems, the election of Duma members has recovered the mixedmember system from proportional representation system. In June, 2013, the All-Russia People's Front has been revamped into a social movement. By bringing together more than 1000 social organizations, it intends to compete for a seat in a single constituency. Members of the Federal Council are directly elected. But it is stipulated that direct election should integrate with the election of local administrative leaders. Every candidate for the administrative office can nominate three people, from which they can choose one and send him to the Federal Council after they win the elections. Since the United Party usually sweeps local elections, thus the Federal Council is basically composed of progovernment representatives, which has actually shored up Putin's regime. In terms of the federal system, local chiefs are allowed to be directly elected, but subject to the president's vetting. Since 2013, the parties that have entered local parliaments are entitled to nominate candidates, from which the president chooses three people for the parliament to elect the final local chief. By setting up such a President-Parliament double-layered vetting system, the central government would be able to exert more control over the local governments.

These governance measures have given Putin a firm grip on Russia's political dynamics, in which the opposition's influence is fading away. On the surface, Russia's politics is rife with competition, but it is actually essentially controlled.

This reality can be further demonstrated by Russia's regulation of the society. From 2011 to 2012, there was a massive “we want honest elections” movement, which marks dramatic changes in the Russian society 20 years after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The biggest change lies in the structure of the political opposition and their mobilization mechanism – non-governmental organizations and the Internet have become important tools for social campaigns and mobilization.

The Putin regime has imposed targeted control over the NGOs and the cyber space. In terms of the NGOs, in 2012, Russia enacted a so-called “foreign agent”law, exercising strict control over overseas capital. In May 2015, Putin signed the undesirable organizations law, which empowers the government to shut down the operation of foreign organizations in Russia without a court's verdict. In terms of the Internet. Since 2012, Russia has carried out a series of bills and laws to regulate the cyberspace, such as the Internet blacklist law, blogger law, anti-piracy law and the legislative amendments that allows the blocking of content suspected in extremism. The legal basis for an Internet supervision system has been established, and it is harsher than the supervision on TV, radio and newspapers. The Russian opposition launched severe attacks on Putin, citing Russia's Internet monitoring is getting increasingly intense, and Putin has established a new censorship system. By putting these measures into practice, Putin has managed to deprived the opposition of wielding power and influence through NGOs and on the Internet, which put them into a dilemma.

In the age of the Soviet Union, Russia was a totalitarian society with all social structures being nationalized and all resources commanded by the state. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia, under Yeltsin's ruling, turned into a “weak state, strong society” framework. The trajectory didn't stop until the Color Revolution broke out in some former Soviet states. Since 2005, the Color Revolution have pushed the Putin government to revise the non-profit organization law to restrain their development. Since 2012, the state power has got a harder grip on the political public domain. In social areas, state governance has turned from liberal to regulatory.

Second, it makes economy more political.

For countries like Russia, politics always tops the rest of everything. Politics is the inner quality of Russia's economy. In the course of Russia's economic management after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Yeltsin age requires breaking the economic monopoly of aristocrats, while the Putin age requires the monopoly of state economy to ensure political stability. The economic development mode has become a cause of struggle of political philosophies. All these happenings can show clearly the political quality in Russia's economic management.

After taking power, Putin put a lot of effort in purging financial aristocrats, whose downfall indicates that the political power has got the upper hand over the capital power. The tendency, reflected in the way the Russian economy develops, is the enhancement of state enterprises, some of which are even entitled to be monopolies. However, the economic effect is not desirable. Although the growth rate is positive, it is not real development.

The causes for the monopolization of the Russian economy are: 1) 300 monotonous cities and towns. They are the products of planned economy, unfit into the versatile market. Meanwhile, 20 million people work and live in these cities, which gives the government no choice but to employ a centralized management and intervene into economy, in which way to maintain social stability. 2) the development imbalance between different regions. The monotonous cities and towns and the pro forma federation reflect a reality that most federal states cannot support themselves independently. 3) A new round of industrialization, whose first priority is to accumulate USD$ 2 trillion to renovate its infrastructures. 4) the fact that the energy and military industries, as two pillars of the Russian economy, can hardly be changed in the short term. Russia's USD$ 770 billion military budget won't happen without the government's insistence. These issues force Russia to develop its economy in a monopolistic way.

Russia's economic issues always derive from political problems, which is reflected on the relationship between the power and capital. Unlike the Western countries, the evolution of the power-capital relationship in Russia is different. In the West, after the destruction of the Roman Empire, a new social class composed of merchants came into being. They were based in cities and made a lot of achievements in opposing the nobility, prelates and monarchs. After the appearance of the new social class, these merchants were entitled with autonomy. But in Russia, the deep-rooted tradition is that power and wealth are centralized in the ruling class, making capital dependent on power, without which capital cannot grow.

In September 2015, the Russian prime minister Medvedev published an article titled A New Reality:Russia and Global Challenges on Rossiyskaya Gazeta. He said that the Russian economy is still generally inefficient, and this problem has a long history – first the state-dominated and highly centralized planned economy and then the “raw material economy”. Taking Canada and Australia as examples, Medvedev argued that Russia could break the “curse of the space”, and it is essential to reform the system and build a new development model that can improve Russia's competitiveness. However, such an economic reform requires constant deliberation given the price of raw materials is at a low ebb. Not only should the Russian government consider the impact of the reform on the people, but carefully evaluate the political element – impediment from the groups of vested interests. Generally speaking, Russia's economic reform, be it supply-side or demand-side, must be “politics-side” in the first place.

Third, Russia's diplomacy has a wide range of extension.

Extension means Russia's diplomacy concerns itself with a lot more issues than what diplomacy usually covers. Not only is it related to how Russia sees and deals with problems such as state modernization, economic globalization and political democracy, but also deeply involved in the relations between Russia and the rest of the world.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia needed to reshape its relationship with the rest of the world, as an important step of its transformation and development. The changes inside and outside of Russia, however, have witnessed an enlarging gap. The process and the changes of Russia's political order have produced mutual effects over each other. Due to the enlargement of NATO, the Bosnian war, the Chechen war and Russia's political environment, Russia has failed to involve in the Western world. As of now, Russia has still not been able to strike a balance between getting involved into the world and maintaining its independence.

The Ukraine crisis has opened up a window, through which we can observe Russia's ties with the rest of the world after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Russia's interactions with the rest of the world can be generalized into three major features: integration, equal co-existence and isolationism. In fact, whatever Russia chooses, it shows Russia's unprecedentedly close ties with the rest of the world.

National interests are determined by national characteristics. Before we figure out what Russia's interests are, we must know what kind of a country Russia is. However, there is no consensus over Russia's state nature in the country, which has been a heated topic between the Slavophiles and Westernizers.

Russia's ruling elite believe that there is no place for Russia in the Western world. On one hand, the West is the financial source of Russia's modernization;on the other hand, it is the culprit that raises geopolitical challenges against Russia. The West is both a role model and a challenger for Russia, which has laid the foundation of neo-isolationism in politics and social awareness. The Russian elite have a strong anti-American sentiment, and their antipathy against the EU is also growing.

Russia being unfairly treated, even betrayed, by the US after the collapse of the Soviet Union has a deep impact on the Russian leader's thought. For example, after 1995, the chance to normalize Russia's relationship with the rest of the world diminished when the US decided to bombard the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Although Putin tried to put the Russia-US ties back on track after the 9/11 attacks, his effort failed and what followed was a new wave of enlargement of NATO and the US' withdrawal from the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems. Even the normalization was re-initiated in 2009, the Libya crisis thwarted the process.

The US's counterbalancing policy against Russia mainly includes three aspects: First, the US seeks Russia's cooperation in issues such as strategic stability and anti-terrorism that concern the US and the international community the most. Second, the US tries to influence Russia's politics, directing the country to political diversity and market economy that meets the international trade norms. Third, the US wants to integrate Russia into the global strategic framework as a power that plans not to change its status quo. However, the Russian elite think otherwise – Russia has been kept by the West from getting a position that it deserves in Europe and the global politics. The West has been behaving like a victor in front of Russia, taking all kinds of measures to squeeze Russia's sphere of influence and commodity market and taking advantage of the NATO and EU enlargement to expand its own political and military leverage. Thus, the Russian experts believe that, although the price is costly, Russia's actions on the Ukraine crisis are quite successful. The annexation of Crimea has stirred up Russia's national pride and patriotism, because the tangible threats put the pubic and Kremlin together. Mostly importantly, Russia's anti-West policies turned from passive to active.

Despite this, the major threat that makes Russia increasingly isolated comes from within. If Russia's mobility strategy is based on an anti-West sentiment, the country will become more isolated. Such mobility strategy assumes an important position in Russia's political philosophies. It derives from the politicians who are extreme nationalists and ultra-left conservatives.

While studying how Putin's character impacts Russia's surrounding situation, experts usually presume that if Putin was not in charge, Russia's relationship with the rest of the world would be totally different. In fact, it is more worthwhile to study how the external situation impacts a state leader's activities. From this perspective, even though Russia's foreign policy is not coherent with its past, it is an integral whole. In the Yeltsin era, the newborn Russian administration had to deal with some basic issues, such as how Russia inherit the Soviet Union's international status, how to deal with nuclear weapons inside and outside Russia, and how to establish new neighborhood relationships. Although Russia takes the Soviet Union's position as a major power, it is incapable of acting as a polar of the global order. The situation plays a major role in Yeltsin's foreign policy, which is to avoid losing the status of a great power. When Putin takes the reins, he needs to transform the ostensible great-power status into real capabilities. Thus, it is reasonable that Putin gathers al the resources he has to shift Russia's national strategy. But the simmering anti-West sentiment broke out after the initiation of “sovereign democracy” in 2005. The Russia-Georgian war in 2008 reflects Russia's eager to take revenge after 20 years of keeping a retrenchment strategy in geopolitics, and the determination to deal with various difficulties left by the fall of the Soviet Union. Under such circumstances, the image of the Russian president is in line with the mission the realities bestow to him.

Conclusion

This paper's analysis clearly shows that the connotations of Putinism aligns with Russia's national characteristics and its history of governance. Russia's national characteristics feather a centralized management over internal issues and a buffer zone strategy. They respectively reflect Russia's national identity and pursuit of collectivism. A centralized management over internal issues means Russia can gather and optimize all political resources to achieve a leap-forward development and build the country into a powerhouse. This is the reflection of Russia's “national identity.” Building a buffer zone is to ensure Russia's national security. Putin's Eurasia strategy, in fact, reflects Russia's collectivism. The combination of “national identity” and collectivism sheds light on two features of Putin's administration: One is making the Russian conservatism, centered on the great-power sentiment, the making-Russia-great-again philosophy, the role of state, and sovereign democracy, a consensus; Two is making Russia more motivated by its mobilization strategy.

The Soviet Union used to be one of the global bipolar system. After its fall, Russia's geopolitical leverage is diminishing when Moscow conducts a series of economic and political reforms. Russia tries very hard to establish a new relationship with the outside world, which is a significant component of the new reform. But so far, Russia is still trying to achieve a satisfying balance between integration, coexistence and isolation. As for the West, the major challenge is how to involve Russia into the new global order. There are multiple difficulties with the process. Russia's new role on the global arena transforms along with its internal political order, and the transformation is far from ending. Many major concerns in the international politics are usually intertwined with Russia's domestic situation.

Generally speaking, the economic foundation determines superstructure, and domestic affairs determine foreign policy. For example, Russia's decline in the 1990s was not caused by external pressures, but the new national system's dysfunction, the immaturity of political stratums and the lack of political will of the top leadership. From the perspective of the outside world, Russia's problem lies in the disorientation of its role in the world and lack of understanding of the world. 1994 is a critical year for Russia to reshape its relations with the world, when the external situation was very favorable. But a failure to grow the economy and improve the politics made Russia stuck in a long-lasting economic crisis and an incompetent and corrupt political environment. These crises caused more turbulence in Russia, which in turn resulted in the hardline foreign policy.

But to some point, external factors may play a determining role. If in Russia, the economy has become a hostage to the politics, which then would have become the hostage to the foreign policy. The Western countries hope Russia could drop its sphere of interest in the Commonwealth of the Independent States and turn into an introverted country that has amiable relationship with all its neighbors. But this would not happen. The ultimate purpose of Russia's rejuvenation is to become a Eurasian country, follow its own path and stick to the bottom line of its geopolitical strategy. All these requirements have structural conflicts with the US' expectation. As long as Russia insists on a rise in the post-Soviet Union space, their contradiction would be irreconcilable.

Understanding Russia and its development path are the precondition for studying Russia. It doesn't mean as outsiders, we should agree with this path, because understanding and commenting on Russia's development path are two different questions. Once Russia takes on a trajectory it is familiar with, will the pendulum effect, which indicates Russia's vicissitude, appear again?

Now, Russia's internal political dynamics and the deep-rooted antipathy against the US will ensure the stability of the Putin administration, but the current economic crisis leaves harder lessons for Russia than the 2008 financial crisis, driving the Putin administration to think deeply about Russia's development path. It can be anticipated that in the Duma elections in 2016 and the presidential election in 2018, the theme will still be the debate about the development path that is centered on Putinism.

What is Russia? What makes Russia? These are still the primary questions we need to explore. The study and analysis of Putinism is only a phase of our understanding of Russia. We cannot use stereotypes to understand Russia, for example, development is China's top priority, while Russia's top priority is security. As Winston Churchill once said, “Russia is a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma.” We hope by studying Putinism, we can have a better understanding of Russia and solve more of its puzzles.